已致295人死亡！三列火车相撞事故原因找到了

The cause of the unfortunate Balasore train accident, as reported by the Commission of Railway Safety (CRS) is as below: -

The rear-collision was due to the lapses in the signalling-circuit-alteration carried out at the North Signal Goomty (of the station) in the past, and during the execution of the signalling work related to replacement of Electric Lifting Barrier for level crossing gate no. 94 at the Station. These lapses resulted in wrong signalling to the Train No. 12841 wherein the UP Home Signal indicated Green aspect for run-through movement on the UP main line of the station, but the crossover connecting the UP main line to the UP loop line (crossover 17A/B) was set to the UP loop line; the wrong signalling resulted in the Train No.12841 traversing on the UP loop line, and eventual rear-collision with the Goods train (No. N/DDIP) standing there.

根据铁路安全委员会（CRS）的报告，不幸的巴拉索尔列车事故原因如下：

追尾事故是由于在（车站的）北信号控制台（North Signal Goomty）进行的信号电路改动失误，以及在为车站 94 号平交道口道闸更换电动升降栅栏的信号施工期间发生的。这些失误导致信号错误。这些失误导致 12841 号列车受到错误的信号影响，即通过正线信号显示绿色，让列车在车站的正线上横过，但连接正线与侧线的交叉岔口（交汇处 17A/B）却设定为侧线；错误的信号导致 12841 号列车在侧线横过，最终与停在该处的货车（N/DDIP 号）追撞。

注：截至2023年5月31日，印度铁路已在11093个平交道口道闸提供了联锁，以增强铁路与道路交叉道口的安全防护。

The CRS report, recommended following of standard practices for carrying out signalling modification work. Any alteration to signalling circuits should be carried out with an approved circuit diagram, in presence of an officer. A separate team should be deployed for checking and testing of modified signalling circuits and functions before restoration or reconnection work.

In the event of a condition wherein both ‘Normal’ and ‘Reverse’ indication relays are detected for a point, all signal movement over that point should be prevented. In case of Electronic Interlocking, this should be registered as a fault condition, and the system should shut down automatically. If the status of a point indication relay (physical relay) is ‘Normal’ then the command for operation of the point from ‘Reverse’ to ‘Normal’ should not generate and vice-versa.

针对该起事故教训：

印度铁路安全委员会报告建议遵循标准流程来进行信号修改工作。对信号电路的任何改动都应在有官员在场的情况下使用经批准的电路图进行。在恢复或重新连接工作之前，应部署一个单独的团队来检查和测试修改后的信号电路和功能。

如果某个位置同时检测到“正常”和“反向”指示继电器，则应阻止经由该处的所有信号移动。如果是电子联锁，则应将其记录为故障情况，并且系统应自动关闭。如果是指示继电器（物理继电器）的状态为“正常”，则不应生成将该点从“反向”操作到“正常”的命令，反之亦然。